



**Exploring the agency of Africa in designing
REDD+ and the associated implications for
national level implementation**

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	4
1.0 Introduction	6
2.0 Unpacking actor agency and institutional interplay.....	7
2.1 Agency.....	7
2.2 Institutional interplay.....	8
3.0 Methods.....	9
3.1 Explore actor roles in designing REDD+ rules at the global level and representation of Africa.....	10
3.2 Analyse the participation of actors in instituting national level REDD+ rules and how this links to the global process.....	11
3.3 Analyse the interplay between REDD+ rules and national sectoral policies	12
3.4 Data analysis	12
4.0 Results.....	13
4.1 Actors and their roles in the global REDD+ design	13
4.2 Representation of Africa in joint REDD+ design platforms.....	17
4.3 From global to national: implementing global rules at national level	21
4.3.1 The FCPF readiness process	21
4.3.2 Implementing REDD+ through the FCPF readiness process	22
4.4 Interplay of REDD+ rules with national sectoral policies	26
4.4.1 The National Forest Act (FA).....	26
4.4.2 The National Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (NASDS).....	27
4.4.3 The National Land Policy (NLP)	27
5.0 Discussion.....	30
5.1 Agency of Africa in global REDD+.....	30
5.2 Implication for the national implementation.....	31
5.3 Implications for local communities.....	33
6.0 Conclusion.....	34
7.0 Acknowledgement.....	35
8.0 References.....	36

Exploring the agency of Africa in designing REDD+ and the associated implications for national level implementation

Joanes Atela and Claire Quinn

Abstract

Rules on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) are globally designed by multiple actors but the outcomes are implemented in developing countries. The coherence of resulting rules with developing country policy setting depends on the agency of these countries in the global process. This paper explores Africa's (African States) agency in the global REDD+ design process then analyses how resulting rules are implemented in an African setting. Interviews and document analysis reveal that multiple State and non-State actors are involved in the global process. However, the agency of Africa in the process is weak partly due to numerical and technical underrepresentation. The weak agency is exacerbated by a focus on REDD+ funds as countries cast themselves as victims of climate change eligible for funds rather than sources of technological solutions. At the national level, the weak agency creates implementation capacity gaps which steers Kenya and other African countries to rely on expertise from resource endowed multilateral intermediaries whose agency is strong and are able to mobilise funds to develop and test REDD+ technologies in these countries. In Kenya, focus on REDD+ funds reinforces path dependency as REDD+ activities are mainstreamed within the country's forestry sector with little integration of key sectors e.g. lands and agriculture because these sectors could 'complicate' delivery of carbon funds yet these sectors are the key drivers of Kenya's forests losses. Consequently, the global REDD+ rules negatively interplay certain policy measures in the excluded sectors, fails to harness expertise across sectors and excludes local communities. These findings do not only re-emphasise an established fact about weak agency of Africa in international climate regimes but goes further to demonstrate how such weak agency could impede effectiveness of emerging regimes such as REDD+ that are specifically targeted at developing countries such as Kenya.

Key words: Africa, carbon, institutional interplay, local communities, Kenya

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1.0 Introduction

Reduced emissions from avoided deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is a global regime designed to mitigate climate change and achieve sustainable development through halting deforestation mostly in developing countries (decision 1/CP 16). REDD+ institutional design involves a negotiation process that brings together multiple actors to design operational rules targeted at developing countries. These actors have different interests and roles in the design process (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). Actors involve individuals, organisations that interact to formulate rules in particular institutional process (Ostrom et al., 1994). Actor typology and roles in REDD+ range from States' representing countries' interests (Phelps et al., 2010b) to non-state actors contributing expertise and resources for REDD+ (Bernard et al., 2014, Reinecke et al., 2014, Peskett et al., 2011, Rosendal and Andresen, 2011, Thompson et al., 2011). The actor spectrum, also includes local communities who mainly expect livelihood benefits and recognition of their rights in REDD+ (Ghazoul et al., 2010, Griffiths and Martone, 2009, Pokorny et al., 2013, Schroeder, 2010).

Despite the multi-actor interests, the effectiveness of the resulting design rules will depend on how much the policy and socioeconomic circumstances of targeted countries are accounted for in the rules (Corbera and Schroeder, 2011, Schroeder, 2010, Brown and Bird, 2008). As such, the agency of developing countries in designing these rules is crucial in determining coherence of global rules with existing policies and subsequent effective implementation of REDD+ at the national level (Brown and Bird, 2008, Brockhaus et al., 2013). Understanding the agency of developing countries in the global REDD+ and how resulting rules are implemented at the national level can contribute essential literature on REDD+ governance and reveal institutional synergies and coherences for the programme's effective governance.

Existing research has usefully analysed particular perspective of global or national level process. Global analysis is dominated by a plethora of studies that castigate the global process for disrespecting local people's participation rights (Sikor et al., 2010, Schroeder, 2010, Rosendal and Andresen, 2011, Rosen and Adrienne, 2011, Ghazoul et al., 2010, Corbera and Schroeder, 2011, Griffiths and Martone, 2009, Evans et al., 2014). National analysis is dominated by investigations into the preparedness of developing countries to receive REDD+ rules (Kanowski et al., 2011, Minang et al., 2014b) or stakeholder involvement in the national readiness processes (Brown et al., 2011, Cerbu et al., 2011, Vatn and Angelsen, 2009). These studies e.g. Minang et al. (2014a) and Ghazoul et al. (2010) mainly

recommend institutional transformation to integrate relevant stakeholders and sectors in REDD+ decisions.

Much of the existing research analysed the global and national processes separately but do not clearly link the institutional processes between the two levels of REDD+ governance. Yet moving towards institutional transformation for REDD+ requires evidence on the sources of institutional conflicts some of which originates from the global process and nests into national policy gaps. To identify these conflicts, this paper explores the process of designing global REDD+ rules and how resulting rules are implemented at the national level. The study uses Kenya as a case country for understanding the how the global process builds into the national process. Document analysis and interviews within the UNFCCC and government departments were the main methods applied to achieve the following objectives: (1) to explore actors and their roles in designing REDD+ rules at the global level (2) to explore the representation of Africa (African states) in the global REDD+ design process (3) to analyse how actors attached to deforestation are integrated into the national REDD+ process and how this is influenced by the global process (4) to analyse the interplay between REDD+ rules with national level sectorial policies on forests, land and agriculture. The study applies the concepts of agency and institutional interplay that are unpacked in the next section. Methods, results and discussions then follow subsequently.

2.0 Unpacking actor agency and institutional interplay

2.1 Agency

Agency is an institutional concept that spans the spectrum of social sciences attempting to understand human behaviours in making joint decisions in their interactions with each other and nature (Elder Jr, 1994, Sawyer and H., 1965, Archer, 2003). In the context of global environmental regimes, both state and non-state actors interact and influence each other's interests in prescribing and implementing rules on environment and development (Schroeder and Lovell, 2012). This study follows on from earth governance studies (Biermann et al., 2009, Dellas et al., 2011, Paavola, 2003) to define actor agency in global environmental regimes as the capacity of an actor to participate in the negotiations procedures and inform decisions within established norms.

The norms of participation in global environmental regimes recognise actor agency based on their mode of governance (e.g. States and non-state bodies) and expertise (Gupta, 2010, Biermann et al., 2010, Biermann et al., 2009, Dellas et al., 2011, Archer, 2003). Mode of governance refers to an organisational structure within which actors' activities and interests are embedded (Dellas et al., 2011,

Schroeder, 2010). Expertise involves scientific knowledge for solving environmental problems (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004). Actors require resources to exercise agency through their mode of governance or expertise (Archer, 2003, Gupta, 2010). Resource endowment determines actors' relative ability to generate and transmit knowledge to decision making forums and sustain their mode of governance as well (Gupta and van der Zaag, 2009).

Agency can be analysed in terms of power relations (Brockhaus et al., 2013) and actor roles and representation (Biermann et al., 2010, Andonova et al., 2009, Schroeder, 2010). The power approach is however fluid, focused on political competition among actors and overlook certain rational decisions that this study also considers (Guzzini, 1993). Both actor role and power relations however overlap as the outcomes of one is indicative of the other (Brockhaus et al., 2013). This study examines actor role and representation to explore agency in REDD+ and adopts. Actor roles in informing REDD+ design components is crucial in the ongoing REDD+ design process because it relies on information generated or contributed by actors for monitoring, verifying and reporting methods on which payments are based (MVR). Representation in joint decision platforms helps actors to learn from others' and bargain for their policy circumstances (Najam et al., 2003, Joshi, 2013, Saleemul and Sokona, 2001). Actor contributions in the global process result in rules that are implemented at the national level. The theory of institutional interplay discussed next enables analysis of interactions between global and national processes.

2.2 Institutional interplay

Institutional interplay involves two or more institutions interacting in a manner that affects their effectiveness in various ways (Young, 2002, Gehring and Oberthür, 2009). Interplay can be unidirectional where the institutions influence each other positively or negatively (Young, 2002, Gehring and Oberthür, 2009, Oberthür and Stokke, 2011). In multilevel interactions, interplay can be horizontal involving institutions of the same level or vertical involving for different levels. Both vertical and horizontal interplay are relevant in REDD+ where global processes are instituted into national policies. Outcomes can be beneficial or complementary if both institutions support similar objectives (Miles et al., 2002). For example, global REDD+ rules on halting deforestation could positively interplay (benefit from) national land policies that inhibit resettlement in forest areas. However, the effects can be adverse in the case of diverging institutional objectives (Urwin and Jordan, 2008). This study used vertical interplay to analyse how the agency of Africa play out in instituting REDD+ rules at the national level and horizontal interplay to analyse how the resulting rules interact with existing sectoral policies. By analysing interplay in the process of policy making and resulting rules, this study

contributes new evidence to institutional interplay literature which has commonly focused on the interplay in outcomes e.g. Kalaba et al. (2014), Raustiala and Victor (2004) . The next section describes methodological steps taken.

3.0 Methods

Data were collected during a three month research visit to the UNFCCC in Bonn, Germany (February to May 2013) and during fieldwork in Kenya (June to August 2013). Document analysis and semi-structured interviews were used in three steps.

Table 1: List of documents reviewed

Document name and year	Documents source	Type of data
Global level documents		
UNFCCC Conference of Parties reports from 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013	UNFCCC archives http://unfccc.int/methods/lulucf/items/6917.php	Information on global REDD+ design process
SBSTA reports and recommendations	UNFCCC archives http://unfccc.int/methods/lulucf/items/6917.php	Information on global REDD+ design process
Submissions from Parties and observer organisations	UNFCCC archives http://unfccc.int/methods/lulucf/items/6917.php	Information on global REDD+ design process
IPCCC reports 2001, 2007, 2013	IPCC archives	Information on global REDD+ design process
World Bank and UN-REDD readiness reports (2008,2010, 2012)	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) archives https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/	Information on global REDD+ readiness process
National level documents		
Revised REDD Readiness Preparation Proposal for Kenya (2010)	Kenya's Ministry of Environment / FCPF archives https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/kenya-0	Information on national REDD+ design process
National Climate Change Action Plan 2013-2017	National Climate Change Secretariat	Information on Kenya's climate change policies
Forest Act 2005	Ministry of Environment	Information on Kenya's forest policies
National Land Policy 2007	Kenya National Land Alliance	Qualitative data on Kenya's land policies
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (2010-2020)	Ministry of Agriculture	Qualitative data on agro-forestry policies

3.1 Explore actor roles in designing REDD+ rules at the global level and representation of Africa

An exploratory review (Thai et al., 2008) of a range of documents (Table 1) was first undertaken to identify actors involved in designing the three main REDD+ components: methodology, finances and safeguards (Angelsen, 2008). Actors included States and non-State organisations and groups (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) who have either made submissions to the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) or have been conferred particular responsibility through SBSTA or COP recommendations. Actors outside these groups were excluded because the study focus was on those involved in the ongoing REDD+ design process. SBSTA is a permanent subsidiary body to the UNFCCC and provides scientific and technological advice to the COP. SBSTA meetings play 'a gate keeper' role for the COP by bringing together actors to decide which actors, approaches and/or data sources are relevant for REDD+ design.

In-depth content analysis of documents was then undertaken through an iterative process (Marsh and White, 2006, Kohlbacher, 2006). The iterative approach has been applied in a wide range of policy studies e.g. Kalaba et al. (2014); Wallbott (2014); Stringer et al. (2009). In this case it involved retrieving and categorising statements on the roles of identified actors into various REDD+ components. Categories of actor roles included information designers (ID), Information receivers (IR) feedback providers (IF). IDs are actors who generate, package and implement ideas e.g. specific MVR methodologies for verifying REDD+ projects. IRs are actors who receive or are informed about packaged ideas from other actors and have to be helped in understanding these ideas because they did not generate the ideas themselves and information transmitters. IFs are actors who are consulted to provide feedback on design options.

In-depth, semi-structured interviews (Hay, 2000) with 12 UNFCCC experts were undertaken to triangulate the actor roles and connections in the SNA and to further establish agency measures. The experts were identified through a snowball sampling process which began with three experts initially identified through general enquiries on who is who in the three design components (Reed et al., 2009). The initial interviews led to the identification of additional experts who could further clarify the roles of actors in the designing the various components. To ensure that key actors and their roles were captured, each expert interviewed provided a list of all actors they thought were key in each design component and this added and triangulated the actor list. Analysis of actor roles focused on low income developing countries as targets for REDD+ and as part of Coalition for Rainforest Alliance to which Africa subscribes in the REDD+ design process.

However, analysis of representation in the key REDD+ technical design platforms of SBSTA and the IPCC specifically focused on Africa. Experts were asked about rules on numerical and technical representation and how these structure the participation and influence of States in designing REDD+ (see appendix 3 for interview guide). Non-participant observation within UNFCCC workshops and seminars was also applied to study Africa’s representation.

Through consultations with the UNFCCC staff, actor roles were classified into agency measures based on whether they design (ID), receive (IR) or give feedback (IF) on REDD+ design options. Based on these roles, actors were classified as either having weak, moderate or strong agency (Table 2). This classification further drew on literature (Schroder, 2010) which indicates that actors who are inform/recipients of outcomes have decreasing agency while those who design outcomes have increasing agency.

Table 2: Categories of agency based on actors’ role in designing REDD+

Description of actor role	Agency classification
IR+ IF	Weak
ID + IF	Moderate
ID+IR+IF:	Strong

3.2 Analyse the participation of actors in instituting national level REDD+ rules and how this links to the global process

The second step focused on how global REDD+ design rules are implemented (instituted) at the national level drawing on evidence from Kenya. The global analysis identified the REDD+ readiness process supported through the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) as the main platform through which most African countries institute global REDD+ rules into their national systems. Analysis of FCPF and Kenya’s readiness documents was undertaken using the same iterative approach applied for the global analysis. Semi-structured interviews with thirteen government stakeholders drawn from various State departments including the Kenya Forest Service hosting REDD+ National Coordination Office (n=5), National REDD+ task force (n=3) Lands Ministry (n=1) and Agriculture Ministry (n=4). The interviews aimed to understand the roles and representation of relevant national sectors and local communities in formulating and implementing REDD+ policies. Lands and agricultural sectors were particularly targeted for the analysis due to their role in driving deforestation in Kenya (Ndungu Land Commission, 2004). REDD+ Secretariat staff clarifies the

stages of implementing REDD+ and linkage with the global process. The staff were also asked how and why other sectors and stakeholders are represented in the national process.

3.3 Analyse the interplay between REDD+ rules and national sectoral policies

Finally, the resulting REDD+ rules were analysed against specific policy measures in the land and agriculture sectors. The sectoral documents analysed include the National Forest Act of 2005, the National Agriculture Sector Development Strategy for 2010-2020 and the National Land Policy. Through an iterative document analysis and interviews, specific policy provisions that interact directly or indirectly with deforestation were identified. The sectoral rules were analysed against specific REDD+ rules e.g. additionality, leakage avoidance, land rights, and safeguards to identify coherence or lack of it.

3.4 Data analysis

Exploratory social network analysis (SNA) (De Nooy et al., 2011) using UCINET was first applied to analyse actor typology and connections. The exploratory network helped in understanding information diffusion between actors and as a guide for qualitative analysis of actor roles in designing REDD+ (Crona and Bodin, 2006, Bodin and Crona, 2009). The SNA was used to generate degree and betweenness centrality scores for each actor (Wasserman, 1994). Degree centrality depicts the number of connections (actors) a particular actor is connected to while betweenness depicts an actor's position as a link between other actors (Wasserman, 1994). Actors with high degree centrality scores potentially possess higher capacity to mobilise other actors than those with low degree centrality scores. High betweenness centrality determines the level to which a particular actor joins or links actors together. Actors with high betweenness centrality potentially brokers ideas between disconnected actors who they link together (Wasserman, 1994). Centrality scores were interpreted to mean the level to which information diffuse to or from these actors but were not indicative of how influential an actor is. The measures were however compared with qualitative analysis of actor roles and agency measures to depict any relationships. Actor agency was based on qualitative analysis of nature of information in the actor connections. This was done through coding of information on respective actor roles supported with illustrative quotes (Krippendorff, 2004).

4.0 Results

Results are presented in four parts corresponding with each of the study objectives. The role of actors in the global REDD+ design is first presented followed by findings on representation of Africa in the global REDD+ design. The interplay between global and national process in then presented in the third part while the last part shows the interplay between resulting REDD+ rules and national sectoral policies.

4.1 Actors and their roles in the global REDD+ design

Figure 1 shows a typology actors involved in designing the three main components of REDD+; methodology, finance and safeguards. The actors include states and non-state actors drawn from global level UN agencies, intergovernmental organisations, multilateral agencies, consultants as well as civil alliances




Figure 1: Network diagram indicating actor connections across the three REDD+ design components.

Figure 2 shows the respective centrality scores and agency measures of actors based on whether they design, receive or transmit information. In terms of centrality scores, consultants, developing countries and multilateral intermediaries

have higher degree and betweenness scores. This shows that these actors are either key sources or targets of REDD+ information. Even though some actors with strong agency in the process have high centrality scores, these scores had no significant relationship with level of agency ($p < 0.000$ at coefficient of 0.07 for degree and 0.30 for betweenness). For instance, despite the high centrality scores for developing countries (Degree = 14 and Betweenness = 10.6), their agency in terms of roles played in REDD+ information flow is weak. They are mainly recipients of technical and financial support from a variety of actors.




Figure 2: REDD+ actors and their agency based on their role in REDD+ design information. Developing countries in this case refer to the low income segment of developing countries to which most African countries participating in REDD+ belong.

The majority of methodological actors have moderate agency in REDD+. Actors here are mainly intergovernmental scientific organisations e.g. Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF), the IPCC and nongovernmental ones such as consultants and NGOs. Most of these actors undertake research activities to design approaches to monitoring land use changes, carbon accounting procedures for REDD+. They provide feedback to the

global process through presentations within SBSTA expert sessions designed to address specific methodological issues such as forest reference levels. They also organise separate side events and sessions to share new research findings and approaches on MVR including ongoing collaborative work with other actors. For example during 18th COP, CIFOR and GLOBAL Observation of Forest and Land Cover Dynamics (GOFC-GOLD) organised a side event on REDD+ national forest monitoring and setting reference levels for the MVR.¹ Consultants (mainly international e.g. German Climatic Action, Winrock international) had strong agency and higher degree centrality scores (14). The consultants engage with different actors across the REDD+ design components to develop REDD+ methodologies and demonstration projects implemented within Africa and other developing countries. African and other developing countries often submit methodological suggestions but most of their submissions analysed from the UNFCCC archives only outline administrative structures with little technical information needed for actual the MVR systems. As such, these countries mainly receive methodological packages from the consultants and intergovernmental scientific bodies. The main methodological rules arrived at so far include national level MVR, avoidance of leakage and avoidance of emission reversals (Table 3).

Multilateral intermediaries have relatively high centrality scores (11 for degree and 3 for betweenness) and strong agency as information designers, recipients and transmitters into global and national policy decisions. Africa and their developing country counterparts are mainly recipients of financial support from these multilateral intermediaries or from bilateral arrangements with developed countries. Multilateral intermediaries such as the World Bank's FCPF, United Nations Collaborative programme on REDD (UN-REDD) have mobilised both market and public funds to support 48 developing countries (16 from Africa) in instituting methodological packages in their national systems. The multilaterals have teams of methodological experts and consultants (e.g. Unique consultants consulting for the World Bank) who draw from the UNFCCC guidelines to design technical details and help in instituting them in developing countries. For instance, Winrock International (USA), and Climate Focus (Netherlands) are currently engaged by the FCPF to help Kenya institute MVR provisions.

The Multilateral intermediaries also test the procedures through demonstration projects and transmit experiences as part of empirical evidence to the UNFCCC process. Private sector businesses e.g. Barclays Bank, Althelia, Macquarie-International Finance Corporation, Ned Bank group, Wildlife Works, Terra Global Capital among others finance REDD+ partly through the multilaterals intermediaries and directly by developing and implementing REDD+

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLZ1FEAFDHOWfkp4eaNRXkoUN4DEJOSF3o>

methodologies such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS). Most REDD+ demonstration projects currently operate under the VCS and these projects have to be approved by the VCS board to be eligible to sell credits. A host of developed countries such as Australia, Netherlands have bilateral arrangements with developing countries but also channel finances developing countries through multilateral intermediaries. The main financial decisions so far made in the negotiations include result based funding through both market based and public funds (Table 3).

In terms of safeguards, Africa alongside other developing countries has a weak agency. Some African countries such as Kenya have safeguard provisions in their environmental laws² but they are expected to merge these with the new REDD+ safeguard rules emerging from the UNFCCC process (Table 3). Most of the current safeguard provisions included in the UNFCCC text were mainly designed, submitted and advocated for by advocacy groups such as the civil society and internationally established forest people organisations.³ Therefore even though Africa and other developing countries play a role in safeguarding the socioeconomic interests of their citizens, their agency is weakened by external procedures which they are mainly expected to report on how they are implementing the safeguards. For instance, SBSTA at its thirty-eighth session requested developing country Parties to submit experiences with implementing the UNFCCC safeguards. Some developing countries made submissions out of which ten Africa countries made a joint submission through the Republic of Chad. The joint submission mainly explained the policy structures being put in place and financial support necessary to address the safeguards⁴. Therefore, most civil society organisations have moderate agency while developing country States have weak agency. Even though the civil society organisations design safeguards, they do not have strong agency because their advocacy is mainly limited to the negotiation process and have no mechanism to enforce these provisions at the national level like the multilateral intermediaries does.

² Republic of Kenya (1999)

³ <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/smsn/ngo/469.pdf>

⁴ FCCC/SBSTA/2014/MISC.6

Table 3: REDD+ design rules based on COP decisions.

Design feature	Description	COP decision
Activities	(1) Avoiding deforestation by for example keeping existing forest intact and addressing key drivers of deforestation	Decision 1/CP. 16 Decision 2/CP. 13
	(2) Avoiding forest degradation by for example avoiding the conversion of natural forest to plantation forest	
	(3) Conservation of forest carbon stocks by	
	(4) Sustainable forest management by avoiding extraction of premature trees below 30 years of age	
	(5) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks through increasing indigenous high carbon value tree species and cover.	
Scale	(1) National and subnational forests defined based on national circumstance e.g. 10% canopy cover for Kenya	Decision 2/CP. 13 UNFCCC (2009), Republic of Kenya 2010
	(2) Subnational projects expected to be nested into national systems.	
	(3) Subnational activities to be verified using expert standards.	
MVR	(1) Credible, result based nationally implemented MVR	Decision 4/CP.15
	(2) The Monitoring process to apply scientific techniques of remote sensing e.g. FAO approaches within the IPCC's LULUCF guide	Decision 1/CP.16 Decision 12/CP.17
	(3) International verification through internationally accepted standards such as the VCS or team of experts	Decision 10/CP.19 Decision 11/CP.19
	(4) Avoiding leakage- avoiding shifting drivers of deforestation to other areas. National MVR to help avoid leakage	Decision 13/CP.19 Decision 14/CP.19
	(5) Additionality- requires that REDD activities increase carbon storage above the level at which it would occur without the activity.	Decision 15/CP.19 UNFCCC (2009)
	(6) Permanence- measures to ensure that emissions avoided are not reversed through future deforestation	
Finance	(1) Result based funding	Decision 4/CP.15
	(2) Both market and public sources: can be in form of grants, loans, budgetary support among others.	Decision 2/CP. 17 Decision 9/CP. 19
	(3) Funds should be managed Principles for REDD+ finances including transparency, accountability, predictability	(UNFCCC, 2009). (UNFCCC, 2012)
Safeguards	(1) Community consultation on land and carbon rights.	Decision 4/CP15
	(2) Community consent in line with the UNFCCC safeguards	Decision 1/CP.16
	(3) Sustainable development and poverty alleviation	Decision 12/CP.17
	(4) Equitable benefit sharing and conflict resolution mechanism	Decision 12/CP19
	(5) Biodiversity conservation	FCPF (2012b)

4.2 Representation of Africa in joint REDD+ design platforms

Representation in established joint climate platforms such as SBSTA, COP and the IPCC allows Africa to participate and reshape information designed by others and also to mould the process to suit their circumstances. This subsection explores Africa's representation in SBSTA sessions and in the IPCC work upon which REDD+ methodology is based.

The SBSTA process involves annual meetings of government experts and observer groups including specialised UN agencies such as FAO and the World Bank, international scientific and implementing NGOs among others. The general agenda of a SBSTA meeting is set by the COP which often asks SBSTA for technical advice on specific REDD+ design components. SBSTA experts collect and synthesise written views from States and observer organisations then presents these for discussion and consensus building at its meetings. The meetings often follow multiple agendas, for example in SBSTA's 30th Session (FCCC/SBSTA/2009/3) there were ten agendas including REDD+ and other climate change issues. Representation in SBSTA negotiations is recognised both in terms of specific country delegates or negotiation coalitions bringing together delegations of several countries.

In terms of delegations, SBSTA has no clear rules on the delegation size representing particular government or observer organisations. Analysis shows that African countries often have fewer delegates compared to other regions. It is argued that African States lack the economic ability to sponsor as many delegates to SBSTA meetings compared to other States.⁵ For instance, in the 30th SBSTA meeting that included REDD+ as part of the agenda⁶, Brazil and Germany were represented by 20 and 71 delegates respectively, while Kenya and DRC had only two and three delegates respectively participating in the meeting (FCCC/SB/2009/MISC.1). Overall, most African States had less than four delegates and in total, Africa represented less than 2% (about 60 out 4216) of the total SBSTA delegation. The few African delegates present are often unable to participate in all the parallel negotiation sessions. As such, they may be unable to learn and internalise design options packaged by other actors due to physical absence from certain sessions. They may also not interact and lobby in informal side events where useful information e.g. new tested technologies, funds for REDD+ are often showcased. According to UNFCCC staff, because of their low numbers, African delegates have to make trade-offs between attending REDD+ sessions or other sessions on issues such as addressing adaptation and vulnerability that they often consider more important for their contexts. As such, it is no surprise that sometimes these delegates do not even participate in REDD+ sessions.

⁵Interview UNFCCC, Bonn March 2013

⁶FCCC/SB/2009/MISC.1 Provisional list of participants to the 30th SBSTA Session held in Bonn, June 2009. UNFCCC, available online:
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sb/eng/misc01.pdf>.

African representatives also participate in specialised SBSTA expert sessions on specific issues e.g setting for reference levels for REDD+.⁷ However these sessions are brief spanning only two days within which several participants have to showcase their experiences on the issues in question.⁸ For example in the 35th expert session, out of 60 experts only one was from Africa and this one was unable to give any insight into the African context for and experience of setting reference levels. As such, decisions from such sessions overlook the specific contextual conditions in Africa. For instance, a decision made in this 35th session that ‘... technical issues, including technical adjustments to forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels, should be separated from the policy issues and socioeconomic and development considerations of a country’⁹ does not fully resonate with the situation in Africa. Ideally forests serve socioeconomic roles supporting national economy and local livelihoods, thereby influencing reference levels.

In terms of coalitions, results show that the ability of African delegates to bargain for their preferences through negotiation coalitions is complicated by diverse interests within coalitions. The African Union established the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) during the 1992 Earth Summit. The AGN aims to pull together African delegates for common negotiation positions. Interviews and documents reveal that the AGN mainly adhere to a common position on issues of financing adaptation but is often in disagreement on issues of REDD+ due to varying regional economic interests. Africa’s rainforests countries e.g. in the Congo basin, are committed to REDD+ but those in Sahel see little economic value in REDD+. The AGN often negotiates with the G77+China which brings together developing nations in climate negotiations. This group is a critical voting block on issues but members often have competing interests informed by their national contexts. Some countries are more interested in agricultural mechanisation and large scale energy mitigation, e.g. China, and this limits commitments to REDD+ especially if REDD+ does not promise adequate economic returns for their economic growth. The opinions of smaller African delegations within the group are often overshadowed by the positions of larger economies of Asia (e.g. India, China) and Latin America (e.g. Brazil).

African delegations also get disfranchised across several coalitions pursuing different interests. For instance, Kenya, Congo and South Africa are all members of the Coalition for Rainforest Alliance committed to forest mitigation but they also belong to the G77 whose general position has been that developed countries need

⁷FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF

⁸FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF

⁹ (FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF: paragraph 33).

to take mitigation responsibility and pay for climate damages. South Africa is also part of the emerging economies including Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) whose interests in industrialisation sometimes overshadow the REDD+ agenda. In the mix of interests and multiple negotiation issues, REDD+ as an agenda itself gets overshadowed and is often picked up by non-State actors in the side events. The position of the small number of African delegations gets further weakened through the layers of interests and coalitions:

‘Sometimes negotiating Experts from Africa ask me what the SBSTA outcome will be but I normally tell them...it is [for] you to decide’

[UNFCCC Methodology expert, Bonn May 2013]

In their submissions however, Africa and their developing country counterparts have pursued a common position on the need for developed countries to honour their financial pledges for REDD+ and other climate actions in line with the common and differentiated responsibility outlined in the UNFCCC text. Through the Coalition for Rainforest Alliance, arguments for funds to cover vulnerability, institutional capacity needs have been advanced.¹⁰

In terms of inclusion in the authorship of technical guidelines, results show that African experts are underrepresented in the IPCC’s land use and land use change forestry (LULUCF) publications upon which REDD+ methodology is based. An analysis of the contribution to the IPCC guidelines¹¹ reveals that out of the 84 authors to the guidelines, only four (less than 5%) were from Africa, mainly drawn from governmental institutions, while 56 were from USA, Europe, Canada and Australia and the rest from Latin America and Asia. Of the experts drawn from the USA and Europe, the majority (75%) are affiliated to national government departments, 5% were affiliated to international research organisations and the rest to Universities. Asked to comment on the reasons behind such geographical and institutional imbalances in climate change technical processes, a member of UNFCCC staff stated:

‘The technical contribution of most developing countries to REDD+ is weak as there is little documentation of their circumstances. We got a lot of complaints from developing country Parties to the effect that ‘our conditions

¹⁰FCCC/TP/2012/3 Financing options for the full implementation of resultsbased actions relating to the activities referred to in decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 70, including related modalities and procedures. UNFCCC.

¹¹IPCC (2000,2006)

are not reflected in the IPCC' and my answer was 'your expertise is not reflected in journals'

[UNFCCC staff, Bonn, March 2013]

Overall, the foregoing examples reveal that the agency of Africa in terms of its role and representation in the joint design platforms is weak. The next section shows how the global REDD+ process plays out at national level implementation based on a Kenyan experience.

4.3 From global to national: implementing global rules at national level

The weak agency of Africa mainly results in institutional capacity gaps needed for the national level implementation but is also exacerbated by sectoral interest in REDD+ funds. The interests in REDD+ funds exposes countries to adhere to expertise from resource endowed actors promising to avail funds but with implications which in terms of failure to harness expertise across sectors for REDD+, failure to address underlying drivers of deforestation and poor community participation. Before analysing the implications, the next subsection outlines the FCPF readiness process to which Kenya and 15 other African countries get financial and expert support to implement REDD+ in their national systems.

4.3.1 *The FCPF readiness process*

The FCPF is an intermediary fund through which bilateral and multilateral REDD+ funds are channeled to developing countries. The fund draws its legitimacy from the 13th and 15th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC which requested developed countries and financial bodies to support REDD+ in developing countries. The FCPF uses its panel of experts and consultants to design COP guidelines and help developing countries in instituting them into their national systems. The process follows three interlinked steps supported by a grant of US\$3.6 million. A country first submits an a readiness idea note (R-PIN) which is an initial intent to participate in the FCPF process. Upon acceptance subject to FCPF standard conditions, a country then prepares Readiness Proposal (R-PP) outlining strategies for executing global REDD+ design. The R-PP is backstopped and evaluated by FCPF experts and consultants' after which a country qualifies to execute result-based REDD+ actions through the FCPF Carbon Fund (FCF). Each step is approved by the World Bank as the Fund's Delivery Partner subject to standard criteria aimed at establishing results based MVR systems for delivering credible carbon credits.

The MVR system encompass technical design provisions including usage of remote sensing to acquire and inteprete, monitor and report carbon information at

national scale and in the context of IPCC guidelines. The readiness process interplays with national process in two ways. First, it adopts a top-down approach in which measures that emphasise carbon delivery are embedded on national institutions and secondly the process has no clear participation and benefit sharing procedures with regards to local communities who depend on the targeted forests for livelihoods. The readiness conditions follow on from the World Bank's safeguard 'Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA)'. The SESA provisions mainly emphasise community consultation and compensation in case of land dispossessions. It neither clarifies nor enforces poverty alleviation or benefit sharing strategies. Carbon is particularly crucial for the funders of the readiness process who include profit seeking private sector investors targeting a post-Kyoto compliance market as well as developed countries expecting to meet their commitment targets. The fund's document therefore state that '...the aim of the FCPF Carbon Fund is to pay for Emission Reductions (ERs) from REDD+ programs and deliver them to the Carbon Fund (Tranche) Participants'¹² and that '...there would be no systematic evaluation of non -carbon values under the Carbon Fund'.¹³

4.3.2 Implementing REDD+ through the FCPF readiness process

These FCPF carbon funds requirements interplay with national level implementation in various ways. Key national sectors and non-State stakeholders are underrepresented because it is believed that their inclusion would make institutions too complex for the delivery of carbon funding. The forestry sector (Ministry of Forestry) through the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) represents the country in readiness meetings but monopolises the national process of establishing REDD+ strategies. A national Taskforce constituting 40 members was established to prepare Kenya's R-PPP in line with UNFCCC and FCPF requirements. Out of the 40 Taskforce members, 13 were from the forestry sector. Agriculture sector is represented by only one person while the Taskforce had no representation from the Lands sector (Table 4).

¹² FCPF (2013: 3)

¹³ FCPF (2012a:13)

Table 4: Role of various stakeholders involved in the Kenya's REDD+ process. Source: modified from the Revised R-PP for Kenya (2010).

Sector/Stakeholder	No of Rep.	Main role in formulation	Main role in implementation
Ministry of Forestry (State Department of Forestry)	13	P, C, M	- Overall coordination, implementation, monitoring and Financial management
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (State Department of Environment)	2	C	- Conflict resolution through National Environment Management Authority
Ministry of Agriculture (State Department of Agriculture)	1	C	NC
Ministry of dryland areas	1	C	NC
Ministry of Finance	1	C	- National conduit for international REDD+ finance
Ministry of water and irrigation	1	P	NC
Ministry of Energy	1	C	NC
Bilateral Partners	2	C	NC
International NGOs	7	P,C,M	- Implement subnational projects
National NGOs	1	C	- Implement subnational projects
National Universities	1	M	- Generate remote sensing tools
Consultants: Winrock Int., (USA), Applied Geosolutions (USA), Climate focus (Netherlands) and FAN (Kenya)	8	P,C,M	- Backstop technical processes
Intergovernmental organizations (IPAC, FAO, UNDP)	3	P	- Funding
Private sector	0	None (only Consulted)	- Implementing subnational projects
Local communities		None (only Consulted)	- NC

Key: P = Policy/ strategy formulation, C=Consultation, M=Developing methodological elements e.g. ways of developing reference levels and capacity needs for such, NC=Not Clear.

In preparing the R-PP, the KFS with the help of (mostly) external consultants selected and apportioned roles to the Taskforce members. The roles span policy, consultation and methodology issues each handled by separate Technical Working Groups (TWG). However, the forestry sector and consultants dominate in all the groups due to their numerical strength. Most importantly, they dominate the policy group tasked with overall management, coordination, and formulation of REDD+ strategies. The input of the one representative of agriculture is minimal and restricted to the less influential consultation group. The consultation group only collects views from other stakeholders such as local communities, through workshops and reports these to the policy group for final write-ups and actions.

Monopoly of the national process by the forestry sector is justified in the country's R-PP document. The document explains that the central role of the forestry sector in designing REDD+ policies is crucial due to the sector's legal mandate and experience in formulating forestry strategies for Kenya over the years. Interviews confirmed this view, adding that the forestry sector represents the country in REDD+ process and understands the requirements and can deliver within the stipulated donor timelines. The sector provides efficient institutional arrangements to institute REDD+ in a manner that would effectively minimise institutional complexities for delivering carbon funds, they argue:

This work of carbon requires good coordination. Donors expect good systems that can produce carbon. It is about delivery of carbon because that is what will attract funds so to avoid competition and conflicts that can affect the carbon work, the Kenya Forest Service is steering the process. Other sectors will be involved in the implementation where necessary'

[Government staff, Department of Forestry Nairobi, July 2013]

In the R-PP however, it is acknowledged that despite the experience of the forestry sector, there is lack of capacity within the sector to implement monitoring, verification and reporting system (MVR) for REDD+. Interviews revealed that most of the forestry staff are not conversant with particular remote sensing techniques expected to be applied in monitoring carbon especially how associated data can be acquired and scaled up from local to national level. It is expected that the readiness process through consultants and FCPF experts will continuously help build capacity of forestry staff to implement the MVR. However asked about the expertise from other sectors such as lands which has been applying remote sensing tools in land mapping, a respondent argued that the these experts have little understanding of REDD+ requirements because they are often not part of Kenyan delegations to REDD+ or wider climate meetings. As such, interviews reveal that most government experts in sectors outside forestry are not even aware of what REDD+ is all about.

In terms of non-State stakeholders, local communities and the private sector are completely unrepresented in the national Taskforce. They are simply consulted through one off regional workshops. For local communities, the extent to which such workshops meaningfully gather their views is contested. The targeted regions (8 provinces) are geographical expansive and are inhabited by close to 5 million persons whose concerns may not be adequately covered by a one off regional workshop. Even though not directly stated, interviews seem to point out that local communities are not represented in the national Taskforce because the national process requires technical skills beyond the scope of these communities:

‘The community is an important stakeholder in the REDD process. They are consulted through regional workshops. They provide important information but this information has to be re-worked by professionals to meet the result-based requirements for the national REDD+ policies’

[Member of Consultation Working Group, August, 2013]

The private sector is however expected to play a key role in implementing the strategies especially through subnational projects. The R-PP also states that the implementation process will draw expertise from all relevant sectors. It is however not clear how this will happen given that the current implementation plan is dominated by the forestry sector (Figure 5.3). Most coordination and technical functions including recruiting technical taskforces are vested in the National Coordination Office (NCO) hosted within the KFS. The plan however includes a National Steering Committee (NSC) made of Permanent Secretaries from various ministries to coordinate sectoral interests. This committee is headed by the forestry Permanent Secretary again completely excludes the representation from Land and Agriculture sectors.¹⁴ Further, the committee’s role is largely ceremonial e.g. approving plans and looking for donors. It does not make any influential inter-sectoral decisions because details, key plans and activities are all prepared by the forestry sector. Peculiar to the implementation plan is the unclear role of the local communities through the Community Forest Associations (CFA). Kenya’s Forest Act legally recognises CFAs as the devolved unit for communities to engage in forest management. However, the establishment of local conservancy officers directly controlled by and reporting to the NCO means that these CFAs are effectively side-lined by the REDD+ process (Figure 3). In any case, the plan does not clarify how the CFAs will contribute to and benefit from the REDD+ work.

Overall, the National REDD+ process, in pursuing carbon for funds excludes key sectors and local communities who are key players in Kenya’s deforestation history. The next section analyses how the carbon requirements interplay with policy measures in the excluded sectors.

¹⁴See Republic of Kenya (2010b) for the list of sectors included in the implementation plan




Figure 3: MVR system proposed in the Kenya’s R-PP. Source: Kenya’s Revised R-PP

4.4 Interplay of REDD+ rules with national sectoral policies

This section first provides a brief description of Kenya’s sectoral policies on forests, agriculture and land. Analysis of how REDD+ interplay with these policies then follow (Table 5.5).

4.4.1 *The National Forest Act (FA)*

The Forest Act of 2005 was enacted as a means to encourage participatory forest management in Kenya. The Act legalised diverse forest management options including leasehold, public, and commercial forest management. The Act entrenches community participation in forest management options. Part IV, sections 45–48, of the Act specifically legalises the establishment of Community Forest Associations (CFA). These associations are constituted by groups of local people with clear interests and plans to manage forests in their areas. However, this Act does not include a legal basis for how external programmes such as REDD+ should engage local communities.

Most measures in the Act positively interplay with carbon requirements. The diverse forest management measures (e.g. commercial and leasehold regimes) could enable private sector investments (Table 5). The CFAs could also enhance community engagement in REDD+ but the lack of clear engagement guidelines could expose these communities to exploitation by non-State actors expected to

implement REDD+ in various localities. The Act also envisages enhancement of indigenous forests which could be useful in addressing concerns about biodiversity protection as required by REDD+ safeguards (Table 5). Measures on reforestation and expansion of area under forest could support carbon requirements such as additionality by increasing carbon capture and sink capacity. However, the Act lacks explicit provisions on curbing underlying drivers of deforestation outside the forestry sector.

4.4.2 The National Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (NASDS)

Kenya's Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) (Republic of Kenya, 2010d) for 2010 – 2020 focuses on enhancing economic development via agriculture. It draws lessons from earlier strategies such as the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) and the Strategy for Revitalizing Agriculture (SRA). The ASDS is administered by the Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU). The strategy largely aims to enhance agricultural production and mechanisation for economic development and alleviation of hunger. To achieve the intended agricultural mechanisation measures including fertilizer use, input subsidies and machinery deployments have been proposed and are being implemented.

The key measures in the Act negatively interplay with carbon requirements for REDD+ by creating leakage and threatening permanence. The envisaged agricultural commercialisation measures are associated with carbon emissions and could create leakage and affect national level additionality (Table 5). Agricultural commercialisation is singled out as a major cause of forest loss through agricultural extensification into forested land.¹⁵ This is exacerbated by the fact that the strategy has no mechanism compelling the authorities within the sector to consult other sectors in making such mechanisation plans. The strategy however recognises sustainable land management activities including agroforestry, water management and agricultural intensification which could enhance carbon additionality on-farm but these may not offset the emissions that would result from the mechanised agriculture.

4.4.3 The National Land Policy (NLP)

The National Land Policy encompasses the land reforms that were enshrined in Study Five of Kenya's constitution (Republic of Kenya 2010). The reforms emphasise the principles of equity, productivity and sustainability in land deals. To achieve these principles, institutional changes in land governance have been proposed while provisions on land ownership (leasehold and freehold) and land

¹⁵Ndungu Land Commission (2004)

types (private, public and communal) have not changed significantly from previous policies. At the national level an independent arm of the State exercise powers that were initially vested in the mainstream state Ministry of Lands. Specifically, the commission has powers to allocate (development control) and acquire land (compulsory acquisition) in the interests of the public. The commission is arguably independent from mainstream State institutions because they reportedly misused powers and subsequently mismanaged the country's land tenure system leading to the loss of public land and forests. However, there have efforts from the mainstream Land's Ministry to retain power to allocate public land ensuing into a tussle between the Lands Minister and the Commission.¹⁶ This shows that despite the land reforms, centralisation regimes through the Lands Ministry could compromise gains these reforms could provide to REDD+.

Nonetheless, most measures in the NLP are associated with underlying drivers of deforestation (Table 5.5). Provision for discrete decisions which do not compel the Lands Authorities, whether the Minister or the Commission, to consult other sectors in allocating land could cause irregular allocation and conversion of forest land as witnessed in past regimes, thereby causing emission reversals and compromising permanence (Table 5). The policy also provides for resettlement procedures as a way of compensation. Resettlement is a major threat to Kenya's forests especially in this era of competitive electoral politics in the country. State Authorities have used such resettlement provisions to allocate forests land for political interests specifically expecting to gain electoral support from the electorate and private funders of the political interests.¹⁷

¹⁶National Press: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nd8aJWgM7zU>.

¹⁷Ndungu Land Commission (2004)

Table 5: Interplay of REDD+ design rules with Kenya’s national policies and drivers of deforestation

Policy	Specific activities proposed in the policy and relevant to forests and REDD+	Interplay with REDD+ rules	Interplay with DD	
			AF	AE
NFA 2005	Intensified afforestation,	Leakage (+)	0	+
	Agroforestry-based alternative livelihood systems	Leakage (+)	+	+
	Alternative energy sources	Finance (+)	0	0
	Public and commercial forest management	Additionality (+)	-/+	0
	Sustainable Forest Management	Safeguards (+)	0	+
	Decentralized community entity : Community forest Associations (CFA)	Safeguards (+)	-/+	-/+
	Increase in indigenous forest	Finance (+)	0	0
	Payment for ecosystem services	Permanence (-)	0	+
	Overall decision making power : Minister (centralised)	Permanence (-)	-	-
	Mechanism for cross-sectorial on decisions: None		-	-
NASDS 2010- 2020	Increase trees on farm (Agroforestry)	Additionality (+)		
	Agricultural intensification	Additionality (-/+)	0	+
	Conservation agriculture	Additionality (+)	0	+
	Value addition to agricultural products	Leakage (-)	0	+
	Extending area under sustainable land management	Additionality (-/+)	0	+
	Enhancing extension services	Safeguard (+)	0	+
	Efficient irrigation and water harvesting	Leakage (+)	0	+
	Climate change information to farmers	Safeguard (+)	0	+
	Agricultural mechanization	Additionality (-)	0	+
	Overall decision making power : Minister (centralised)	Permanence (-)	-	-
	Mechanism for cross-sectorial consultations : None	Permanence (-)	-	-
	Legally decentralized community entity : None	Safeguards (-)	-	-
			-	-
NLP 2007	Conservation of land based natural resources	Additionality (+)		
	Strengthening land rights	Safeguards (+)	0	+
	Legalized public, private and communal land rights	Safeguards (-/+)	0	+
	Transfer rights e.g. freehold and leasehold	Safeguards (-/+)	0	+
	Compensation through resettlement	Permanence (-)	-/+	-/+
	Overall decision making power : Minister (centralised)	Permanence (-)	-	-
	Decentralized community entity : Community Lands Board	Safeguards (+)	-	-

Key: NFA=National Forest Act, NLP= National Land Policy, NASDS= National Agricultural Sector Development Strategy DD=Drivers of Deforestation AF= Allocation of gazetted forests land, AE= Agricultural Extensification (+) = Positive interplay, (-) = Negative Interplay (0) = Not clear.

5.0 Discussion

5.1 Agency of Africa in global REDD+

Various actors play varying roles in designing REDD+. Results here show that although developing countries are targeted for REDD+ their agency in designing various REDD+ components is weak. These countries receive ideas from many actors intending to support, collaborate or test technologies with them. This could explain why the countries have the highest centrality scores yet their agency is weak. Therefore quantitative network measures were mainly useful in visualising the quantity of information diffused to and from actors involved in designing REDD+ but qualitative aspect of the networks in the a policy process provide insights on actor influence on decisions. (Crona and Bodin, 2006).

The weak agency of developing countries especially Africa partly results from their inability to generate and transmit scientific information needed for technical decisions. This could be explained by a number of factors. Africa's economic constraints limits governments' investments in research that could help develop inbuilt technical capacity to inform REDD+. Priority in resource allocation is given to development and pressing livelihood matters while investment in research is marginal e.g. only 0.6% share of world gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) compared to Asia's and Europe's 30.5%, and 27.2% respectively (Teng-Zeng, 2009). Other studies report similar technical limitation of Africa in climate regimes and recommend technology transfer as a key solution (Najam et al., 2003, Nhamo, 2011, Makina, 2013).

Technology transfer is acknowledged in the UNFCCC text (UNFCCC, 1992) and can take place through globally established negotiation forums and joint scientific platforms where actors showcase and learn new approaches (Makina, 2013). However, this Study reveals that Africa do not make any meaningful knowledge exchanges in these forums because they are represented by fewer delegates (in the negotiations) and authors (in the IPCC land use reports) compared other regions. Studies have reported that larger delegations from other regions often get their preferences into decisions over Africa's because they have more voting power and diverse expertise able to interpret information, critique and lobby across multiple sessions and side events during negotiations (Makina, 2013, Minang, 2009, UNfairplay, 2011). As such, the Africa's smaller delegations compromise the continent's ability to bargain for appropriate interventions that suit their circumstances or question others' suggestions to enhance their own understanding. While various REDD+ technologies are not alien to Africa's circumstances because they have been developed and tested in Africa either

through international scientific bodies or other non-African experts, inbuilt capacity within governments is necessary to effectively and sustainably implement such techniques.

Even though expertise and underrepresentation are commonly blamed as impediments to Africa's agency, this Study points towards the possibility that interest in REDD+ and other climate funds also contribute to the weak agency. Emphasis on the need for developed countries to honour their financial pledges whether for REDD+ or other climate programmes further weakens the continent's agency in REDD+. The belief that climate change results from developed countries as championed by negotiation coalitions and embedded in the wider political economy casts Africa as 'a victim' eligible for help rather than a source of technological solution. Studies report that funding for sustainable development is the main issue Africa has pursued collectively both in REDD+ and the wider climate debates (Najam et al., 2003, Nhamo, 2011, Frost, 2001). While this Study has not investigated the role political economy plays in REDD+ design in a detailed manner, the possibility that Africa's financial interests in climate regimes could undermine its own technical interests in REDD+ and other regimes needs further investigation.

The story about Africa's weak agency in climate regimes may not be new. In the context of REDD+ though, it is a key concern given that the programme is specifically expected to be implemented and coordinated by African governments. The weak agency has implications for REDD+ implementation at the national level from where activities are coordinated and local level where forests are hosted.

5.2 Implication for the national implementation

At the national level, the Kenyan case shows that the weak agency creates institutional capacity gaps which steers the country to rely on expertise from resource endowed intermediaries able to avail funds. Kenya implements the global REDD+ rules through financial support from the FCPF readiness fund. The readiness process usefully mobilises funds for REDD+ without which interest in REDD+ could wane, especially in the context of alternative land uses (Clements, 2010, Rosendal and Andresen, 2011). Results however reveal that in efforts to deliver carbon funding, key sectors and stakeholders attached to deforestation are excluded from implementing REDD+ in Kenya.

The key sectors and stakeholders are excluded because they could create institutional impediment for delivering carbon for funding. This perception can be attributed to the country's rush to be part of FCPF funds but is also deeply nested with existing path dependency in Kenya's sectoral decisions. Interest in REDD+

funds is evident in the global positions taken by Africa and other developing countries (Brown et al., 2011). In the case of Kenya, interest to be part of the FCPF fund and efforts to meet associated timelines could have resulted in a rush (six months) to prepare the country's R-PP taking the convenient path engaging experiences of the forestry sector but with little sectoral integration. As such, the process mainly relied on workshops rather than in-depth feasibility analysis that could have identified the role of other sectors in deforestation. While the rush for REDD+ funds is reported in most countries (Cerbu et al., 2011), the possibility that interests in funds could compromise credibility of emission reduction through REDD+ needs attention.

Interest in emerging REDD+ funds also plays into existing path dependency in Kenya's resource regimes to the exclusion of key sectors in the REDD+ process. The claim that the forestry sector is best suited to handle REDD+ is a manifestation of path dependency whereby sectors have over time monopolised specific resource decisions linked to their respective mandates (Shannon, 2003, Phelps et al., 2010a). Path dependency can be good if it can bring about positive experiences for REDD+ (Shelby and Morgan, 1996). However, failure by sector-driven Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) to address deforestation (Blom et al., 2010, Brown and Bird, 2008, Minang and van Noordwijk, 2013) casts doubts on the effectiveness of such past experiences. In the context of limited funding from the national budget, path dependency has created stiff competition for climate mitigation and adaptation funds among Kenya's sectors (Maina et al., 2013). The monopoly of REDD+ by the forestry sector could as well be interpreted as an attempt to guard REDD+ funds from other sectors. Such sectoral interests may reduce a global REDD+ into a sectoral initiative falling into the traps of ICDP failures.

Studies have reported poor stakeholder engagement in REDD+ readiness of various countries e.g. Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru (Minang et al., 2014b); Brazil (Brockhaus et al., 2013). However, this study further shows evidence on how sectoral exclusion could impede REDD+ by limiting the possibility of drawing expertise from other sectors but also failing to attend to drivers of deforestation that lie outside the forestry sector. For instance the fact that Kenya's land sector has been excluded from implementing national REDD+ limits the sector's ability to contribute its expertise on land mapping techniques to the national MVR system which instead rely on international consultants. This could also mean that the weak agency in the global process exposes countries to adhere to expertise designed by resource endowed actors rather than scope for their own (Gupta and van der Zaag, 2009). Similarly, the evidence reveal that policy measures in the excluded land and agriculture sectors, if not factored into the national REDD+

process could still cause massive deforestation and reverse any emission reduced through REDD+. In other words, while sectors are excluded as a means to safeguarding REDD+ funds, such exclusion could impede any meaningful achievement of emission reduction and compromise the much targeted carbon funding. Other than national sectors, the local communities are also excluded in the Kenya's REDD+ process and this also posit implications for REDD+ as discussed next.

5.3 Implications for local communities

This study shows that the local community underrepresented in the national REDD+. This represents a negative interplay in the process which occurs in two ways: disrespect of community participation rights and potential elite capture of benefits.

In terms of participation, the communities are underrepresented because they are simply consulted through one off workshop and are not clearly integrated in the implementation plan. Underrepresentation of local communities in national REDD+ is reported in most developing countries and has been attributed to poorly decentralised forest management and continued monopoly of forest by the government (Brown et al., 2011, Chhatre et al., 2012, Minang et al., 2014b, Cerbu et al., 2011). The Kenyan case however reveals that despite decentralising forest management to Community Forestry Associations through the Forest Act of 2005 (Republic of Kenya, 2005), the local communities are still not involved apparently because they lack skills needed for the formulation of carbon requirements. Instead, parallel institution 'Local Forest Conservancy' that is directly recruited and assigned roles by the national REDD+ office is established as the main link to the local level. This indicates that path dependency may scuttle any gains in resource decentralisation and challenges the notion that decentralisation automatically translates into effective community participation in environmental decision making (Mathur et al., 2013, Martin and Lemon, 2001). In the context of REDD+, exclusion of local communities could negate States' commitments to safeguarding participation rights of local communities even though the REDD+ safeguards (appendix 1/COP. 16) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP, 2008) expects States to do so.

Poor participation of local communities is a recipe for elite capture of benefits (Schroeder, 2010). On one hand, credible carbon generation is crucial for climate mitigation and is a source of the much needed REDD+ funding (Bernard et al., 2014). On the other hand the carbon agenda in the Kenyan case and elsewhere

does not clarify benefit sharing with regard to local forest-based livelihoods. In the absence clear benefit sharing, the local livelihoods may be locked in commoditisation of carbon for funds to the benefit of the government (Ghazoul et al., 2010, Phelps et al., 2010b, Barnsley, 2009). The UNFCCC safeguards calls on countries to ensure equitable and clear benefit sharing mechanisms. The FCPF readiness process mainly aims to deliver carbon. The associated social safeguards (SESA) are not clear on benefit sharing yet the UNFCCC safeguard expects benefit sharing to be clarified. This exposes weaknesses in the UNFCCC systems especially the framework's lack of enforcement mechanism for safeguards that are crucial for climatically vulnerable poor.

Finally, community exclusion in national REDD+ compromises States' commitment to protecting local communities from exploitation by non-State actors. The gaps may also provide an opportunity for these non-State actors to exercise agency and become more legitimate in the local community than the State itself resulting in institutional disconnectedness in the process (Gupta and van der Zaag, 2009). Indeed non-State actors such as the private sector and NGOs sanctioned to initiate subnational REDD+ projects and implement them within local communities and are currently the main actors in subnational projects in Kenya (Atela et al., 2014) (Study 5) and globally (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014).

6.0 Conclusion

This study has analysed the process of designing REDD+ at the global level and how this process interplay national REDD+ implementation. The study specifically focused on the agency of Africa in designing REDD+ at the global level and draws evidence from Kenya to show how this agency plays out at the national level. The global analysis shows that Africa is underrepresented in the global REDD+ decisions due to little technical and institutional capacity to inform technical decisions about REDD+. Interest in REDD+ funds also cast the continent as a victim of climate change eligible for help rather than a source of technological solutions and this further weakens its agency. The weak agency exacerbated by sectoral interest in the REDD+ funds and creates gaps in institutional capacity needed to for the national level implementation but is also. The interests in REDD+ funds exposes Kenya and other African countries to adhere to expertise designed by resource endowed actors but this mainly creates negative interplay which manifest in terms of failure to harness expertise across sectors for REDD+, failure to factor in underlying drivers of deforestation in the national REDD+ and poor community participation. These factors are deeply embedded in national institutional structures of Kenya and many other African States but must be addressed for effective implementation of REDD+. Measures such as investment

in research and technology, institutional capacity building and mechanisms for sectoral consultations could be useful for effective implementation of REDD+ in an African setting. This study contributes to literature on REDD+ governance.

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